

Term Information

Effective Term Spring 2021

General Information

Course Bulletin Listing/Subject Area Political Science
Fiscal Unit/Academic Org Political Science - D0755
College/Academic Group Arts and Sciences
Level/Career Graduate
Course Number/Catalog 7260
Course Title Authoritarian Politics
Transcript Abbreviation Authoritarian Pol
Course Description Familiarizes students with basic theoretical and empirical approaches to the study of authoritarian politics; introduces classic and cutting edge research.
Semester Credit Hours/Units Fixed: 3

Offering Information

Length Of Course 14 Week, 12 Week, 8 Week, 7 Week, 6 Week, 4 Week
Flexibly Scheduled Course Never
Does any section of this course have a distance education component? No
Grading Basis Letter Grade
Repeatable No
Course Components Seminar
Grade Roster Component Seminar
Credit Available by Exam No
Admission Condition Course No
Off Campus Never
Campus of Offering Columbus

Prerequisites and Exclusions

Prerequisites/Corequisites
Exclusions
Electronically Enforced Yes

Cross-Listings

Cross-Listings

Subject/CIP Code

Subject/CIP Code 45.1001
Subsidy Level Doctoral Course
Intended Rank Masters, Doctoral

Requirement/Elective Designation

The course is an elective (for this or other units) or is a service course for other units

Course Details

Course goals or learning objectives/outcomes

- Familiarize students with basic theoretical and empirical approaches to the study of authoritarian politics.
- Introduce students to classic and new research in the field.

Content Topic List

- Rise to power and survival strategies for dictators.
- Authoritarian institutions: The ruling party
- Authoritarian institutions: Parliaments
- Authoritarian institutions: Elections
- Authoritarian institutions: Bureaucracies
- Propaganda and information control
- Repression
- Resistance: Coups
- Resistance: Mass uprisings and democratization
- Authoritarian regimes and development
- Authoritarian regimes and public goods
- Authoritarian regimes and corruption

Sought Concurrence

No

Attachments

- POLISC 7260 syllabus.pdf: POLITSC 7260 Syllabus

(Syllabus. Owner: Smith, Charles William)

Comments

Workflow Information

Status	User(s)	Date/Time	Step
Submitted	Smith, Charles William	09/24/2020 09:05 AM	Submitted for Approval
Approved	Caldeira, Gregory Anthony	09/24/2020 11:39 AM	Unit Approval
Approved	Haddad, Deborah Moore	09/24/2020 12:02 PM	College Approval
Pending Approval	Jenkins, Mary Ellen Bigler Hanlin, Deborah Kay Oldroyd, Shelby Quinn Vankeerbergen, Bernadette Chantal	09/24/2020 12:02 PM	ASCCAO Approval

POLITSC 7260: Authoritarian Politics
THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, SPRING 2021

Instructor: Jan H. Pierskalla
Time and Location: Tuesday 2:00pm-4:45pm, Derby Hall 2078
Contact: pierskalla.4@osu.edu
Web: <http://janpierskalla.wordpress.com/>
Office Hours: Tue 12:00-2:00pm, Derby Hall 2062

Overview and Objectives

This class is an introduction to the research literature on authoritarian politics. Given the resurgence of authoritarian regimes across the world and the simultaneous erosion of democratic norms in established democracies, understanding the emergence, development, shape, and structure of authoritarian regimes is a key research question in comparative politics. The goal of this class is threefold. First, to familiarize you with basic theoretical and empirical approaches to the study of authoritarian politics; second, to simultaneously introduce you to the classics and cutting edge of the field; third, to push you towards doing your own research on authoritarian politics. Good research combines technical skills with important substantive questions. Hence, we will engage the readings for this class with an eye toward the linkages between theory, research design, and data.

The course is organized in roughly four parts. We will begin with discussing basic concepts and measurement strategies from the authoritarian politics literature. The second part of the class covers classic theories of authoritarian survival and their implications for political institutions in authoritarian regimes, elections in dictatorships, authoritarian bureaucracies, propaganda and information control, and strategies of repression. The third section of the course looks at forms of resistance against authoritarian rule: coups and mass movements. Finally, we look at the downstream consequences of authoritarian rule for development, public goods provision, and corruption.

Requirements

The course will be taught in a seminar format.

- **RESEARCH PAPER, PRESENTATION, AND FEEDBACK (60%):** 5000-8000 words. Proposal due on 2/18, presentation on 4/14. The final version of the paper is due on 4/26. You will also be required to provide written feedback for one of your peer's papers. The paper should include the early beginnings of an empirical analysis and / or a fully fledged research design. Here is some useful generic advice on doing research as a graduate student:
 - <https://medium.com/@paul.niehaus/doing-research-18cb310529e0>.
 - <http://jenniferdoleac.com/resources/>.
- **GROUP REPLICATION EXERCISE (20%):** Build teams of two to three. Pick an empirical article from the syllabus and prepare a short replication memo. Please only pick an article if it has a well-documented replication archive. Your replication memo should cover a brief summary of

the main hypothesis, research design, data sources, specifics of the modeling approach. Then reproduce the main table(s)/finding(s), and identify potential areas of weakness. Implement one extension or robustness check. The replication report is due on 3/30.

- PARTICIPATION (20%): This seminar thrives with your active participation. I expect you to:
 - Read all the assigned readings before class.
 - Prepare a short summary for each article or book on the assigned reading list. The summary should include the main question/puzzle, the argument/key hypotheses, research design, main findings, and at least two issues or questions you had about the piece. You should be ready to present your summary to the rest of class. I will randomly call on students to present their summary.

- GRADING: I will apply the standard OSU letter grading scale:
 - A (93-100)
 - A- (90-92.9)
 - B+ (87-89.9)
 - B (83-86.9)
 - B- (80-82.9)
 - C+ (77-79.9)
 - C (73-76.9)
 - C- (70-72.9)
 - D+ (67-69.9)
 - D (60-66.9)
 - E (0-59)

- ATTENDANCE POLICY: We will meet once per week during the semester. Regular attendance is expected. The classroom is a great place to exchange ideas, meet your classmates, and ask questions. If you do not attend regularly, it will be difficult to pass the class.

- SUMMARY OF MOST IMPORTANT DATES:
 - 2/18: Research paper proposal
 - 3/30: Replication exercise due
 - 4/14: Research paper presentation
 - 4/26 Final version of the research paper

Classroom Policy

The classroom is one of the most important places to learn, engage, develop ideas, and communicate. We should all aim to establish an environment that enhances the academic experience. There are some basic principles we should embrace: 1. Use electronic devices respectfully. 2. Arrive on time.

Communication

The classroom is the best place to raise questions, which are relevant for everybody in the class. Questions not directly relevant to all students, are ideally raised at the end of class. The office hours should be dedicated to discuss more in-depth questions and your assignments. In fact, within the first two weeks I encourage everybody to come to my office hours at least once. Emails are a last resort! Think twice before sending an email (Subject header should always include the course number and your full name). On weekdays you can expect that I reply to your emails, within 24 hours. Be prepared to remind me, should my attention slip. I will not respond to emails over the weekend (except in urgent cases).

Academic Misconduct

It is the responsibility of the Committee on Academic Misconduct to investigate or establish procedures for the investigation of all reported cases of student academic misconduct. The term “academic misconduct” includes all forms of student academic misconduct wherever committed; illustrated by, but not limited to, cases of plagiarism and dishonest practices in connection with examinations. Instructors shall report all instances of alleged academic misconduct to the committee (Faculty Rule 3335-5-487). For additional information, see the Code of Student Conduct <http://studentlife.osu.edu/csc/>.

- General: <https://oaa.osu.edu/academic-integrity-and-misconduct>

Disability

The University strives to make all learning experiences as accessible as possible. If you anticipate or experience academic barriers based on your disability (including mental health, chronic or temporary medical conditions), please let me know immediately so that we can privately discuss options. To establish reasonable accommodations, I may request that you register with Student Life Disability Services. After registration, make arrangements with me as soon as possible to discuss your accommodations so that they may be implemented in a timely fashion. SLDS contact information: slds@osu.edu; 614-292-3307; slds.osu.edu; 098 Baker Hall, 113 W. 12th Avenue.

Mental Health—PLEASE TAKE CARE OF YOURSELF

As a student you may experience a range of issues that can cause barriers to learning, such as strained relationships, increased anxiety, alcohol/drug problems, feeling down, difficulty concentrating and/or lack of motivation. These mental health concerns or stressful events may lead to diminished academic performance or reduce a student's ability to participate in daily activities. The Ohio State University offers services to assist you with addressing these and other concerns you may be experiencing.

If you are or someone you know is suffering from any of the aforementioned conditions, you can learn more about the broad range of confidential mental health services available on campus via the Office of Student Life's Counseling and Consultation Service (CCS) by visiting ccs.osu.edu

or calling 614-292-5766. CCS is located on the 4th Floor of the Younkin Success Center and 10th Floor of Lincoln Tower. You can reach an on-call counselor when CCS is closed at 614-292-5766.

If you are thinking of harming yourself or need a safe, non-judgmental place to talk, or if you are worried about someone else and need advice about what to do, 24 hour emergency help is also available through the Suicide Prevention Hotline (Columbus: 614-221-5445 / National: 800-273-8255); or text (4hope to 741741); or at suicidepreventionlifeline.org

Beyond class activities

OSU has many interesting talks and seminars that pertain to the topics of the class. I will make you aware of interesting events as they come up. I will notify you on the specific dates as they are published.

Course Material

Each week usually features four to five assigned readings. I expect you to read all assigned readings in detail before class. I encourage you to build a functional library beyond the core readings of this class.

Course Outline

Week 1 (Jan 12): Introduction & Concepts, Definitions, and Measurement

- Core readings:
 - J. A. Cheibub, J. Gandhi, and J. R. Vreeland. Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited. *Public Choice*, 143(1-2):67–101, 2009
 - B. Geddes. What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2(1):115–144, 1999
 - B. Geddes, J. Wright, and E. Frantz. Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set. *Perspectives on Politics*, 12(2):313–331, June 2014
- Supplementary readings:
 - L. Diamond. Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes. *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2):21–35, Apr. 2002. Publisher: Johns Hopkins University Press
 - F. Zakaria. The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. *Foreign Affairs*, 76(6):22–43, 1997

Week 2 (Jan 19): The Rise to Power and Survival Strategies for Dictators

- Core readings:
 - M. W. Svobik. Which Democracies Will Last? Coups, Incumbent Takeovers, and the Dynamic of Democratic Consolidation. *British Journal of Political Science*, 45(04):715–738, Oct. 2015
 - M. W. Svobik. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press, 2012
 - R. B. Myerson. The Autocrat’s Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State. *American Political Science Review*, 102(01):125–139, Feb. 2008

- O. J. Reuter and T. F. Remington. Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem: The Case of United Russia. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(4):501–526, Apr. 2009. Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc

- Supplementary readings:

- J. Brownlee. Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies. *World Politics*, 59(04):595–628, July 2007
- C. Boix and M. W. Svolik. The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships. *The Journal of Politics*, 75(02):300–316, Apr. 2013
- T. Pepinsky. The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(3):631–653, July 2014. Publisher: Cambridge University Press
- S. Satyanath, N. Voigtländer, and H.-J. Voth. Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital and the Rise of the Nazi Party. *Journal of Political Economy*, 125(2):478–526, Mar. 2017
- S. Berman. Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic. *World Politics*, 49(3):401–429, 1997
- E. Lust-Okar. Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition. *Comparative Politics*, 36(2):159–179, 2004. Publisher: Comparative Politics, Ph.D. Programs in Political Science, City University of New York
- A. Kokkonen and A. Sundell. Delivering Stability – Primogeniture and Autocratic Survival in European Monarchies 1000-1800. *American Political Science Review*, 108(2):438–453, 2014
- V. Menaldo. The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs. *Journal of Politics*, 74(3):707–722, 2012
- Spenkuch Jörg L. and Tillmann Philipp. Elite Influence? Religion and the Electoral Success of the Nazis. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(1):19–36, Aug. 2017
- S. Gehlbach, K. Sonin, and M. W. Svolik. Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2015
- M. W. Svolik. Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2):477–494, 2009
- M. W. Svolik. Contracting on Violence The Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and Military Intervention in Politics. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 57(5):765–794, Oct. 2013
- M. Svolik. Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation. *American Political Science Review*, 102(02):153–168, May 2008
- R. Wintrobe. *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*. Cambridge University Press, 1998

Week 3 (Jan 26): Authoritarian Institutions I: The Ruling Party

- Core readings:

- D. Slater. *Ordering Power. Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in South-east Asia*. Cambridge Univ Press, 2010

- S. Gehlbach and P. Keefer. Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 39(2):123–139, June 2011
- K. F. Greene. The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance. *Comparative Political Studies*, 43(7):807–834, July 2010
- B. Smith. Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule. *World Politics*, 57(03):421–451, Apr. 2005
- V. Shih, C. Adolph, and M. Liu. Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China. *American Political Science Review*, 106(01):166–187, Feb. 2012
- Supplementary readings:
 - M. Blum and A. de Bromhead. Rise and fall in the Third Reich: Social advancement and Nazi membership. *European Economic Review*, 120:103312, Nov. 2019
 - R. Jia, M. Kudamatsu, and D. Seim. Political Selection in China: The Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 13(4):631–668, Aug. 2015
 - F. Keller. Networks of Power: Using Social Network Analysis to understand who will rule and who is really in charge in the Chinese Communist Party. 2015
 - O. J. Reuter and D. Szakonyi. Elite Defection under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia. *American Political Science Review*, pages 1–17
 - O. J. Reuter and J. Gandhi. Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic Parties. *British Journal of Political Science*, 41:83–110, 2010
 - J. Zhu and D. Zhang. Weapons of the Powerful: Authoritarian Elite Competition and Politicized Anticorruption in China. *Comparative Political Studies*, 50(9):1186–1220, Aug. 2017
 - J. K.-S. Kung and S. Chen. The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China’s Great Leap Famine. *American Political Science Review*, 105(01):27–45, Feb. 2011

Week 4 (Feb 2): Authoritarian Institutions II: Parliaments

- Core readings:
 - J. Gandhi. *Political Institutions under Autocracy*. Cambridge Univ Press, 2008
 - O. J. Reuter and G. B. Robertson. Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes. *The Journal of Politics*, 77(1):235–248, Jan. 2015. Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
 - E. Malesky and P. Schuler. Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament. *American Political Science Review*, 2010
 - E. Malesky, P. Schuler, and A. Tran. The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly. *American Political Science Review*, 106(04):762–786, Nov. 2012
- Supplementary readings:

- M. Albertus and V. A. Menaldo. Dictators as Founding Fathers? The Role of Constitutions Under Autocracy. *Economics & Politics*, 2012
- J. Brownlee. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Cambridge Univ Press, 2007
- S. Gehlbach and P. Keefer. Private Investment and the Institutionalization of Collective Action in Autocracies: Ruling Parties and Legislatures. *The Journal of Politics*, 74(2):612–635, 2012
- E. Malesky. Gerrymandering Vietnam Style: Escaping Partial Reform Equilibrium in a Non-Democratic Regime. *Journal of Politics*, 71(1):132–159, 2009
- N. M. Jensen, E. Malesky, and S. Weymouth. Unbundling the Relationship between Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk. *British Journal of Political Science*, 44(3):655–684, July 2014
- J. Gandhi and A. Przeworski. Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats. *Comparative Political Studies*, 40:1279–1301, 2007
- J. Wright. Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(2):322–343, 2008

Week 5 (Feb 9): Authoritarian Institutions II: Elections

- Core readings:

- B. Magaloni. *Voting for Autocracy. Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press, 2006
- S. Levitsky and L. A. Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. Cambridge University Press, 2010
- A. Rundlett and M. W. Svobik. Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Macrobias in Electoral Fraud. *American Political Science Review*, 110(01):180–197, Feb. 2016
- A. Simpson. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections. Theory, Practice, and Implications*. Cambridge University Press, 2013

- Supplementary readings:

- R. Enikolopov, V. Korovkin, M. Petrova, K. Sonin, and A. Zakharov. Field experiment estimate of electoral fraud in Russian parliamentary elections. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 110(2):448–452, Jan. 2013. Publisher: National Academy of Sciences Section: Social Sciences
- T. Frye, O. J. Reuter, and D. Szakonyi. Hitting Them With Carrots: Voter Intimidation and Vote Buying in Russia. *British Journal of Political Science*, pages 1–25, Feb. 2018
- J. Gandhi and E. Ong. Committed or Conditional Democrats? Opposition Dynamics in Electoral Autocracies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 0(0)
- S. D. Hyde. The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. *World Politics*, 60(01):37–63, Oct. 2007
- W. Kim and J. Gandhi. Coopting Workers under Dictatorship. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(03):646–658, July 2010
- A. T. Little. Elections, Fraud, and Election Monitoring in the Shadow of Revolution. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 7(3):249–283, June 2012

- Z. Luo and A. Rozenas. Strategies of Election Rigging: Trade-Offs, Determinants, and Consequences. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 13(1):1–28, Mar. 2018
- M. K. Miller. Democratic Pieces: Autocratic Elections and Democratic Development since 1815. *British Journal of Political Science*, 45(03):501–530, July 2015
- S. Nichter. Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot. *American Political Science Review*, 102(01):19–31, Feb. 2008
- J. A. Tucker. Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(3):535–551, Sept. 2007. Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Week 6 (Feb 16): Authoritarian Institutions III: Bureaucracies

- Core readings:

- A. V. Zakharov. The Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off in Dictatorships and Outside Options for Subordinates. *The Journal of Politics*, 78(2):457–466, Jan. 2016
- M. Hassan. *Regime Threats and State Solutions. Bureaucratic Loyalty and Embeddedness in Kenya*. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2020
- A. De Juan, F. Haass, and J. H. Pierskalla. Indoctrination and preference falsification in autocracies: Evidence from a natural experiment in the German Democratic Republic. 2020
- S. Gehlbach and A. Simpser. Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(1):212–224, 2015
- A. Rozenas, R. Talibova, and Y. M. Zhukov. Fighting for Tyranny How State Repression Shapes Military Performance. 2019

- Supplementary readings:

- P. Ager, L. Bursztyn, and H.-J. Voth. Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II. Working Paper 22992, National Bureau of Economic Research, Dec. 2016
- Y. Bai and R. Jia. Elite Recruitment and Political Stability: The Impact of the Abolition of China’s Civil Service Exam. *Econometrica*, 84(2):677–733, Mar. 2016
- Y. J. Chen, P. Li, and Y. Lu. Career concerns and multitasking local bureaucrats: Evidence of a target-based performance evaluation system in China. *Journal of Development Economics*, 133:84–101, July 2018
- G. Egorov and K. Sonin. Dictators and Their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty–Competence Trade-Off. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 9(5):903–930, 2011
- D. D. Gueorguiev and P. Schuler. Keeping Your Head Down: Public Profiles and Promotion under Autocracy. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 2016
- J. Jiang. Making Bureaucracy Work: Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and Economic Development in China. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(4):982–999, 2018
- D. C. Mattingly. Responsive or Repressive? How Frontline Bureaucrats Enforce the One Child Policy in China. *Comparative Politics*, July 2019

- O. J. Reuter and G. B. Robertson. Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments. *Journal of Politics*, 74(4):1023–1037, 2012

Week 7 (Feb 23): Propaganda, Information Control, and ICTs

- Core readings:

- S. Guriev and D. Treisman. How Modern Dictators Survive: An Informational Theory of the New Authoritarianism. Working Paper 21136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Apr. 2015
- M. Adena, R. Enikolopov, M. Petrova, V. Santarosa, and E. Zhuravskaya. Radio and the Rise of The Nazis in Prewar Germany. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130(4):1885–1939, Nov. 2015
- C. Gläsel and K. Paula. Sometimes Less Is More: Censorship, News Falsification, and Disapproval in 1989 East Germany. *American Journal of Political Science*, n/a(n/a)
- G. King, J. Pan, and M. E. Roberts. How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression. *American Political Science Review*, 107(02):326–343, May 2013
- X. Xu. To Repress or to Co-opt? Authoritarian Control in the Age of Digital Surveillance. *American Journal of Political Science*, n/a(n/a). eprint: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111>

- Supplementary readings:

- D. Cantoni, Y. Chen, D. Y. Yang, N. Yuchtman, and Y. J. Zhang. Curriculum and Ideology. *Journal of Political Economy*, 125(2):338–392, Mar. 2017
- J. Chen and Y. Xu. Information Manipulation and Reform in Authoritarian Regimes. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 5(1):163–178, Jan. 2017
- G. Egorov, S. Guriev, and K. Sonin. Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data. *American Political Science Review*, 103(04):645–668, Nov. 2009
- P. Selb and S. Munzert. Examining a Most Likely Case for Strong Campaign Effects: Hitler’s Speeches and the Rise of the Nazi Party, 1927–1933. *American Political Science Review*, pages 1–17
- B. Barber and C. Miller. Propaganda and Combat Motivation: Radio Broadcasts and German Soldiers’ Performance in World War II. *World Politics*, 71(3):457–502, July 2019
- D. D. Gueorguiev and E. J. Malesky. Consultation and Selective Censorship in China. *The Journal of Politics*, pages 000–000, July 2019
- H. Huang. The Pathology of Hard Propaganda. *The Journal of Politics*, 80(3):1034–1038, May 2018
- H. Huang. Propaganda as Signaling. *Comparative Politics*, 47(4):419–437, 2015. Publisher: Comparative Politics, Ph.D. Programs in Political Science, City University of New York
- H. Huang. A War of (Mis)Information: The Political Effects of Rumors and Rumor Rebuttals in an Authoritarian Country. *British Journal of Political Science*, 47(2):283–311, Apr. 2017. Publisher: Cambridge University Press

- J. Jiang and D. L. Yang. Lying or Believing? Measuring Preference Falsification From a Political Purge in China. *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(5):600–634, Apr. 2016
- H. L. Kern and J. Hainmueller. Opium for the Masses: How Foreign Media Can Stabilize Authoritarian Regimes. *Political Analysis*, 17(4):377–399, 2009
- B. Knight and A. Tribin. The Limits of Propaganda: Evidence from Chavez’s Venezuela. Working Paper 22055, National Bureau of Economic Research, Mar. 2016
- P. Lorentzen. China’s Strategic Censorship. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(2):402–414, 2014
- Peisakhin Leonid and Rozenas Arturas. Electoral Effects of Biased Media: Russian Television in Ukraine. *American Journal of Political Science*, 0(0)
- A. Rozenas and D. Stukal. How Autocrats Manipulate Economic News: Evidence from Russia’s State-Controlled Television. *The Journal of Politics*, 81(3):982–996, July 2019. Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
- D. Stockmann and M. E. Gallagher. Remote Control: How the Media Sustain Authoritarian Rule in China. *Comparative Political Studies*, 44(4):436–467, Apr. 2011
- P. A. Testa. Education and propaganda: Tradeoffs to public education provision in nondemocracies. *Journal of Public Economics*, 160:66–81, Apr. 2018
- N. B. Weidmann and E. G. Rød. *The Internet and Political Protest in Autocracies*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2019
- D. Yanagizawa-Drott. Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(4):1947–1994, Nov. 2014

Week 8 (Mar 2): Repression

- Core readings:

- E. H. Ritter and C. R. Conrad. Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression. *American Political Science Review*, 110(01):85–99, Feb. 2016
- C. M. Sullivan. Blood in the Village: A Local-Level Investigation of State Massacres. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 29(4):373–396, Sept. 2012
- A. Rozenas and Y. M. Zhukov. Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin’s ‘Terror by Hunger’. *American Political Science Review*, pages 1–15
- R. Truex. Focal Points, Dissident Calendars, and Preemptive Repression. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 63(4):1032–1052, Apr. 2019
- A. Scharpf and C. Gläbel. Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina. *American Journal of Political Science*, 0(0)

- Supplementary readings:

- L. R. Arriola. Protesting and Policing in a Multiethnic Authoritarian State: Evidence from Ethiopia. *Comparative Politics*, 45(2):147–168, Jan. 2013
- L. Blaydes. *State of Repression. Iraq under Saddam Hussein*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2018

- R. Braun. Religious Minorities and Resistance to Genocide: The Collective Rescue of Jews in the Netherlands during the Holocaust. *American Political Science Review*, 110(01):127–147, Feb. 2016
- V. Charnysh and E. Finkel. The Death Camp Eldorado: Political and Economic Effects of Mass Violence. *American Political Science Review*, 111(4):801–818, Nov. 2017
- C. Davenport. *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace*. Cambridge University Press, 2007
- T. Dragu and A. Przeworski. Preventive Repression: Two Types of Moral Hazard. *American Political Science Review*, 113(1):77–87, Feb. 2019
- E. Finkel. Mass Killing and Local Context. *Comparative Politics*, 45(1):107–124, Oct. 2012
- S. Chestnut Greitens. *Dictators and Their Secret Police*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 2016
- P. R. Gregory, P. J. H. Schröder, and K. Sonin. Rational dictators and the killing of innocents: Data from Stalin’s archives. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 39(1):34–42, Mar. 2011
- B. Harff. No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955. *American Political Science Review*, 97(01):57–73, 2003
- A. Scharpf. Ideology and state terror: How officer beliefs shaped repression during Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’. *Journal of Peace Research*, page 0022343317748346, Feb. 2018
- J. H. Pierskalla. Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government Repression. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 54(1):117–145, Feb. 2010
- C. M. Sullivan. Political Repression and the Destruction of Dissident Organizations. *World Politics*, FirstView:1–32, Aug. 2016
- C. M. Sullivan. Undermining Resistance Mobilization, Repression, and the Enforcement of Political Order. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 60(7):1163–1190, Oct. 2016
- S. A. Tyson and A. Smith. Dual-Layered Coordination and Political Instability: Repression, Co-optation, and the Role of Information. *The Journal of Politics*, 80(1):44–58, Oct. 2017
- S. A. Tyson. The Agency Problem Underlying Repression. *The Journal of Politics*, 80(4):1297–1310, Aug. 2018
- B. Valentino. *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century*. Cornell University Press, 2005
- Y. M. Zhukov and R. Talibova. Stalin’s terror and the long-term political effects of mass repression. *Journal of Peace Research*, page 0022343317751261, Feb. 2018

Week 9 (March 9): Resistance I: Coups

- Core readings:

- A. T. Little. Coordination, Learning, and Coups. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 61(1):204–234, Feb. 2015
- B. A. Casper and S. A. Tyson. Popular Protest and Elite Coordination in a Coup d’état. *The Journal of Politics*, 76(2):548–564, 2014

- E. Frantz and E. A. Stein. Countering Coups: Leadership Succession Rules in Dictatorships. *Comparative Political Studies*, 50(7):935–962, June 2017
- A. Dube, E. Kaplan, and S. Naidu. Coups, Corporations, and Classified Information. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126(3):1375–1409, Aug. 2011
- T. Wig and E. G. Rød. Cues to Coup Plotters Elections as Coup Triggers in Dictatorships. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 60(5):787–812, Aug. 2016
- Supplementary readings:
 - H. Albrecht and F. Eibl. How to Keep Officers in the Barracks: Causes, Agents, and Types of Military Coups. *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(2):315–328, June 2018
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 - C. Bodea and C. Houle. Ethnic inequality and coups in sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of Peace Research*, 54(3):382–396, May 2017
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 - M. Gilli and Y. Li. Coups, revolutions and efficient policies in autocracies. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 39:109–124, Sept. 2015
 - J. Johnson and C. L. Thyne. Squeaky Wheels and Troop Loyalty: How Domestic Protests Influence Coups d’état, 1951–2005. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 62(3):597–625, Mar. 2018
 - N. Singh. *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups*. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 2014
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 - J. Powell. Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’état. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 56(6):1017–1040, 2012
 - J. Roosa. *Pretext for Mass Murder. The September 30th Movement & Suharto’s Coup d’Etat in Indonesia*. University of Wisconsin Press, 2006
 - P. Roessler. The Enemy Within. Personal Rule, Coup and Civil War in Africa. *World Politics*, 63(2):300–346, 2011
 - A. Rozenas and S. M. Zeigler. From ballot-boxes to barracks: Votes, institutions, and post-election coups. *Journal of Peace Research*, page 0022343318779423, July 2018
 - J. K. Sudduth. Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships. *Comparative Political Studies*, 50(13):1768–1801, Nov. 2017

Week 10 (March 16): SPRING BREAK

Week 11 (March 23): Resistance II: Mass Uprisings and Democratization

- Core readings:
 - T. Kuran. Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. *World Politics*, 44(1):7–48, 1991

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- C. Crabtree, H. L. Kern, and S. Pfaff. Mass Media and the Diffusion of Collective Action in Authoritarian Regimes: The June 1953 East German Uprising. *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(2):301–314, June 2018
 - D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2006
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 - P. C. Dower, E. Finkel, S. Gehlbach, and S. Nafziger. Collective Action and Representation in Autocracies: Evidence from Russia’s Great Reforms. *American Political Science Review*, 112(1):125–147, Feb. 2018
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 - M. Albertus and V. Gay. Unlikely Democrats: Economic Elite Uncertainty under Dictatorship and Support for Democratization. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(3):624–641, July 2017
 - D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson. A Theory of Political Transitions. *American Economic Review*, 91(4):938–963, 2001
 - D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson. Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(4):1167–1199, 2000
 - T. S. Aidt and P. S. Jensen. Workers of the world, unite! Franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in Europe, 1820-1938. *European Economic Review*, 72:52–75, 2014
 - T. S. Aidt and R. Franck. Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence From the Great Reform Act of 1832. *Econometrica*, 83(2):505–547, Mar. 2015
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 - A. Hadenius and J. Teorell. Pathways from Authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy*, 18(1):143–156, 2007
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 - E. Finkel. *Ordinary Jews. Choice and Survival during the Holocaust*. Princeton University Press, 2017
 - E. Finkel. The Phoenix Effect of State Repression: Jewish Resistance during the Holocaust. *American Political Science Review*, 109(02):339–353, May 2015

- D. Fu. *Mobilizing Without the Masses. Control and Contention in China*. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2018
- T. Kuran. Sparks and Prairie Fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution. *Public Choice*, 61:41–74, 1989
- A. Lizzeri and N. Persico. Why Did the Elite Extend the Franchise? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britains Age of Reform. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(2):705–763, 2004
- S. Lohmann. Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-1991. *World Politics*, 47:42–101, 1994
- B. J. Moore. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 1966
- K. Schock. *Unarmed Insurrections. People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*. University of Minnesota Press, 2005
- M. J. Stephan and E. Chenoweth. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. *International Security*, 33(1):7–44, 2008
- K. Weyland. Crafting Counterrevolution: How Reactionaries Learned to Combat Change in 1848. *American Political Science Review*, 110(02):215–231, May 2016

Week 12 (March 30): Outcomes I: Authoritarian Regimes and Development

- Core readings:

- A. Przeworski, M. E. Alvarez, J. A. Cheibub, and F. Limongi. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2000
- W. Easterly. *The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor*. Basic Books, 2014
- D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. *American Economic Review*, 91(5):1369–1401, 2001
- H. Fang, L. Hou, M. Liu, L. C. Xu, and P. Zhang. Factions, Local Accountability, and Long-Term Development: Theory and Evidence. Working Paper 25901, National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2019

- Supplementary readings:

- D. Acemoglu, S. Naidu, P. Restrepo, and J. A. Robinson. Democracy Does Cause Growth. *Journal of Political Economy*, Sept. 2018
- M. A. Baum and D. A. Lake. The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(2):333–347, Apr. 2003
- D. C. North and B. R. Weingast. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England. *The Journal of Economic History*, 49(4):803–832, 1989
- M. Olson. Dictatorship, democracy, and development. *American Political Science Review*, 87(3):567–576, Jan. 1993

Week 13 (Apr 6): Outcomes II: Authoritarian Regimes and Public Goods Provision

- Core readings:
 - M. Albertus. *Autocracy and Redistribution. The Politics of Land Reform*. Cambridge University Press, 2016
 - L. Tsai. *Accountability without Democracy*. Cambridge Univ Press, 2007
 - L. Blaydes. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge University Press, 2011
 - J. Chen, J. Pan, and Y. Xu. Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(2):383–400, Mar. 2016
 - M. Martinez-Bravo, G. Padro-i Miguel, N. Qian, and Y. Yao. *Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence from Rural China*. Apr. 2011. Published: NBER Working Paper 16948
- Supplementary readings:
 - T. Besley and R. Burgess. The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4):1415–1451, 2002
 - D. S. Brown and A. M. Mobarak. The Transforming Power of Democracy: Regime Type and the Distribution of Electricity. *American Political Science Review*, 103(02):193–213, May 2009
 - S. Haggard and R. R. Kaufman. *Development, Democracy, and Welfare States. Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe*. Princeton University Press, 2008
 - R. Harding and D. Stasavage. What Democracy Does (and Doesn't do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections. *The Journal of Politics*, 76(01):229–245, 2014
 - M. Kudamatsu. Has Democratization Reduced Infant Mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Micro Data. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 10(6):1294–1317, 2012
 - G. Miller. Women's Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(3):1287–1327, Aug. 2008
 - B. A. Olken. Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. *American Political Science Review*, 104(02):243–267, May 2010
 - M. Ross. Is Democracy Good for the Poor? *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(4):860–874, 2006
 - N. Voigtländer and H.-J. Voth. Highway to Hitler. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2684404, Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY, Oct. 2015

Week 14 (April 13): Outcomes III: Authoritarian Regimes and Corruption

- Core readings:
 - R. Fisman. Estimating the Value of Political Connections. *American Economic Review*, 91(4):1095–1102, 2001

- T. Ferguson and H.-J. Voth. Betting on Hitler—The Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(1):101–137, Feb. 2008
- D. Szakonyi. Princlings in the Private Sector: The Value of Nepotism. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 14(4):349–381, Oct. 2019
- T. Chen and J. K.-s. Kung. Busting the ‘Princlings’: The Campaign against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2018
- J. Jiang and M. Zhang. Friends with benefits: Patronage networks and distributive politics in China. *Journal of Public Economics*, 184:104143, Apr. 2020

- Supplementary readings:

- J. S. Earle, S. Gehlbach, A. Shirikov, and S. Shpak. Preventing Predation: Oligarchs, Obfuscation, and Political Connections. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3501060, Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY, Dec. 2019
- J. Jiang and Y. Zeng. Countering Capture: Elite Networks and Government Responsiveness in China’s Land Market Reform. *The Journal of Politics*, pages 000–000, July 2019
- P. Lorentzen and X. Lu. Personal Ties, Meritocracy, and China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign. 2018
- E. J. Malesky, D. D. Gueorguiev, and N. M. Jensen. Monopoly Money: Foreign Investment and Bribery in Vietnam, a Survey Experiment. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(2):419–439, Feb. 2015
- J. Pan and K. Chen. Concealing Corruption: How Chinese Officials Distort Upward Reporting of Online Grievances. *American Political Science Review*, pages 1–19, June 2018
- R. Truex. The Returns to Office in a “Rubber Stamp” Parliament. *American Political Science Review*, 108(02):235–251, May 2014
- B. Zhu. MNCs, Rents, and Corruption: Evidence from China. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(1):84–99, Jan. 2017

Week 15 (April 20): Presentations

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